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2. The report was co-financed between the Scottish Parliament and Sheffield Hallam 
University.  
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4. This report examines the impact of welfare reform on the Scottish labour market in 
order to explore whether there is any merit in the claim that welfare reform 
increases overall levels of employment and reduces unemployment.  This is one 
of the key arguments used to justify welfare reform. 
5. Previously published estimates show that when the pre-2015 welfare reforms 
have come to full fruition they will take £1.5bn a year out of claimants’ pockets in 
Scotland, equivalent to £440 a year for every adult of working age. 
6. The report explores the labour market impact of the reforms primarily by taking 
account of the big variation in the financial losses from place to place across 
Scotland.  If the reforms are having an important impact on the labour market, it 
should be possible to observe a much greater impact in the places where the 
reforms have hit hardest. 
7. Across Scotland, the places where the financial losses from welfare reform have 
been greatest have experienced the largest reductions in unemployment (JSA) 
claimant rates. 
8. There is however no evidence across Scotland of an impact on incapacity (ESA) 
claimant rates, or that welfare reform has resulted in higher levels of employment 
or higher levels of labour market engagement. 
9. On closer investigation it is also apparent that the larger than average reductions 
in unemployment in the places hit hardest by welfare reform also happened in 
previous economic upturns.  This makes it impossible to attribute recent trends to 
welfare reform. 
10. The recent upturn in the UK economy nevertheless differs from its predecessors in 
creating higher employment in relation to the modest growth in output.  This could 
mean welfare reform is encouraging low-wage employment but this interpretation 
is not consistent with the local data. 
11. On balance, the evidence in the report provides little support for the view that 
welfare reform is having important and positive impacts on the labour market in 
Scotland. 
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Scope and purpose of the report 
12. Welfare reform has been a defining feature of Westminster government policy 
since 2010.  The reforms apply to Scotland as much as to any other part of the 
United Kingdom, even though Scotland has found ways to avert the full impact of 
some of the changes.1 
13. The Westminster government has justified the welfare reforms on two grounds.  
First, the reforms reduce public spending and therefore contribute to deficit 
reduction.  Second, the reforms are intended to encourage claimants to find work, 
or to increase their hours of work, rather than rely on benefits.  This second 
argument – that welfare reform should increase labour market participation and 
raise employment levels – is the focus of the present study.  Are more people now 
in work in Scotland as a result of welfare reform?  Or has welfare reform made 
little difference to labour market outcomes? 
14. The present report builds directly on the shoulders of three previous reports for the 
Scottish Parliament.  These looked at: the financial losses arising from welfare 
reform to Scotland as a whole and in each of its 32 local authorities2, at the 
financial losses at ward level3; and at the cumulative financial losses to different 
types of households4.  All these reports in turn drew on a wider body of pioneering 
research and data at Sheffield Hallam University covering welfare reform across 
the whole of the UK5. 
15. The previous reports held all other factors constant.  In other words, there was no 
assumption that any loss of benefit income led to compensating adjustments in 
the labour market in the form of extra employment or additional working hours.  
The present report breaks new ground by exploring whether these adjustments 
have indeed taken place and, therefore, whether the loss of benefit income has 
been offset in whole or in part by extra income from employment. 
16. A number of studies undertaken or commissioned by the Department for Work 
and Pensions have considered whether specific elements of the welfare reform 
agenda are having a labour market impact6.  The present report is however the 
first attempt, as far as the authors are aware, to examine the cumulative impact of 
the reforms on the labour market.  This is important because a number of reforms 
are happening simultaneously and many individuals and households are affected 
by several aspects of the package.  It is the cumulative impact of these 
simultaneous reforms that is most likely to have a labour market impact. 
17. Furthermore, the present report focuses on the impact on the labour market as a 
whole rather than on the changes in individuals’ labour market behaviour.  This is 
important because the decisions and behaviour of individuals are likely to interact.  
An unemployed person who finds work may do so at the expense of another, who 
remains unemployed instead.  Likewise, an existing employee who is successful 
in increasing their hours may do so at the expense of another member of staff. 
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18. What matters most in understanding the labour market impact of welfare reform is 
not whether individuals’ behaviour has changed but whether the labour market as 
a whole shows improvement.  Has welfare reform reduced unemployment?  Are 
more men and women engaged with the labour market because of the reforms?  
And most crucially of all, is the overall level of employment as a result any higher?  
These are the key yardsticks by which the impact of welfare reform on the labour 
market needs to be judged.  They are the indicators that tell us whether there is 
any substance to the Westminster government’s claim that welfare reform moves 
people into work. 
19. This is nevertheless an exploratory exercise.  A full assessment of the impact of 
welfare reform on the labour market would require a more comprehensive 
investigation deploying a wider range of methods and data than has been possible 
here. 
The welfare reforms 
20. The present report covers the labour market impact of the welfare reforms 
underway between 2010 and 2015.  These are: 
Housing Benefit – Local Housing Allowance 
21. Changes to the rules governing assistance with the cost of housing for low-income 
households in the private rented sector.  The new rules apply to rent levels, 
‘excess’ payments, property size, age limits for sole occupancy, and indexation for 
inflation. 
Non-dependant deductions 
22. Increases in the deductions from Housing Benefit, Council Tax Benefit and other 
income-based benefits to reflect the contribution that non-dependant household 
members are expected to make towards the household’s housing costs 
Household benefit cap 
23. New ceiling on total payments per household, applying to the sum of a wide range 
of benefits for out-of-work claimants 
Disability Living Allowance 
24. Replacement of DLA by Personal Independence Payments (PIP), including more 
stringent and frequent medical tests, as the basis for financial support to help 
offset the additional costs faced by individuals with disabilities 
Incapacity benefits 
25. Replacement of Incapacity Benefit and related benefits by Employment and 
Support Allowance (ESA), with more stringent medical tests, greater conditionality 
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and time-limiting of non-means tested entitlement for all but the most severely ill or 
disabled 
Child Benefit 
26. Three-year freeze, and withdrawal of benefit from households including a higher 
earner 
Tax Credits 
27. Reductions in payment rates and eligibility for Child Tax Credit and Working Tax 
Credit, paid to lower and middle income households 
1 per cent up-rating 
28. Reduction in annual up-rating of value of most working-age benefits, which would 
normally have been increased with inflation 
29. A fuller description of each of these reforms, including the timing of 
implementation, is contained in the appendices of two previous reports for the 
Scottish Parliament7. 
30. The vast majority of these welfare reforms were initiated by the Coalition 
government in Westminster, notably but not exclusively through the Welfare 
Reform Act 2012.  Some of the incapacity benefit reforms, however, are Labour 
measures that pre-dated the 2010 general election but only took full effect after 
the election.  They are included here to provide a comprehensive view of the 
impact of the reforms that have been underway over the last few years. 
31. In the Scottish context, two important omissions from the list are worth noting: 
 Council Tax Benefit.  In collaboration with Scottish local authorities, the Scottish 
Government has chosen not to pass on to claimants the Westminster 
Government’s 10 per cent cut in the value of Council Tax Benefit payments. 
 Housing Benefit: under-occupation in the social rented sector.  This reform, 
better known as the ‘Bedroom Tax’, is effectively not being implemented in 
Scotland from 2014-15 as a result of the Scottish Government’s decision to 
make available sufficient funding for Discretionary Housing Payments to fully 
offset the reduction in Housing Benefit. 
32. Three further omissions are worth noting: 
 Universal Credit.  This is scheduled to replace just about all means-tested 
working age benefits but unlike the other reforms it is not expected to lead 
directly to a reduction in welfare spending. Universal Credit is better understood 
as a repackaging of existing benefits that for the first time introduces a 
consistent benefit withdrawal rate.  There are still major delays in the full 
implementation of Universal Credit. 
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 Income Support for lone parents.  The qualifying age of the youngest child has 
been reduced from under 7 to under 5.  The effect is to transfer the lone parent 
from Income Support to Jobseeker’s Allowance at the same payment rate but 
with a new requirement to look for work. 
 RPI to CPI for benefits uprating.  This was introduced from 2011-12 but is really 
part of a much wider accounting reform, including for example all public service 
pensions. 
33. When fully implemented, the welfare reforms covered in this report, including 
those that no longer apply to Scotland, are expected to save the UK Treasury 
around £18bn a year. 
34. In its July 2015 Budget, the Westminster government announced a further round 
of welfare cuts intended to save the Exchequer a further £12bn a year.  The 
implementation of these cuts still lies ahead and therefore their impact on the 
labour market cannot be monitored here but the final section of the report 
considers the possible effects in the light of the evidence on the labour market 
impact of the pre-2015 reforms. 
The financial losses in Scotland 
35. Table 1 shows the estimated financial losses across Scotland as a whole arising 
from the pre-2015 welfare reforms.  These figures are taken from the third of the 
earlier reports for the Scottish Parliament8 and are revised and updated versions 
of the figures presented in the two previous reports, which include full details of 
data sources and methods.  In brief, the estimates involve taking the Treasury’s 
expected financial savings arising from each reform and allocating the financial 
losses to Scotland and local areas on the basis of claimant data from DWP and 
HMRC.  Data from the Westminster government’s Impact Assessments and in 
some cases from pilot schemes also plays a part. 
36. Table 1 shows that when the reforms have come into full effect they can be 
expected to take around £1.5bn a year out of the Scottish economy, or an average 
of £440 a year for every adult of working age – that is, an average of £440 for 
every person in Scotland aged between 16 and 64, whether or not they claim 
welfare benefits9.  
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 loss  
£m p.a. 
Loss per  
working age adult 
£ p.a. 
Tax Credits 350 100 
Disability Living Allowance 320 90 
Incapacity benefits 280 80 
Child Benefit 240 70 
1 per cent uprating 230 65 
Housing Benefit: LHA 80 25 
Non-dependant deductions 20 5 
Household benefit cap 4 <5 
  
  Total 1,520 440 
      
Source: Sheffield Hallam estimates based on official data 
 
38. In Scotland, and indeed in the rest of the UK, the biggest financial impact of the 
pre-2015 welfare reforms comes from the changes to Tax Credits – an estimated 
loss in Scotland of £350m a year.  The changeover from DLA to PIP and the 
reforms to incapacity benefits also account for substantial sums - £320m and 
£280m a year respectively.  Changes to Child Benefit (£240m a year) and the 
below-inflation uprating of most working-age benefits from April 2013 (£230m a 
year) also account for substantial sums. 
39. The overall scale of the financial loss in Scotland (£440 a year per adult of working 
age) is just below the GB average (£450).  Scotland is hit substantially harder than 
South East England (£370) but less than Wales (£520), London (£490), North 
West England (£530) or North East England (£530)10. 
40. It should not escape note, however, that the impact in Scotland would have been 
around £35 a year higher (i.e. around £475 per adult of working age) if the 
Scottish Government had not struck a deal with local authorities to avoid passing 
on the cut in Council Tax Benefit or put in place arrangements to defray the impact 
of the ‘Bedroom Tax’ using Discretionary Housing Payments.  The financial 
burden of these welfare reforms is being borne by public sector budgets in 
Scotland rather than by benefit claimants. 
41. Table 2 shows the estimated financial loss arising from the reforms in each of 
Scotland’s 32 local authority districts.  These figures are again taken from the third 
of the previous reports for the Scottish Parliament11 and are revised and updated 
from those first published.  
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Table 2: Overall financial loss arising from pre-2015 welfare reforms, by local authority 
  
Estimated 
 loss  
£m p.a. 




 Glasgow  239 580 
 Inverclyde  30 570 
 West Dunbartonshire  33 550 
 Dundee  52 540 
 North Ayrshire  47 540 
 North Lanarkshire  113 510 
 East Ayrshire  40 500 
 Clackmannanshire  17 500 
 Renfrewshire  55 480 
 South Lanarkshire  96 470 
 South Ayrshire  32 470 
 West Lothian  53 460 
 Dumfries and Galloway  42 450 
 Midlothian  24 450 
 Fife  103 440 
 Falkirk  44 430 
 Argyll and Bute  22 410 
 East Lothian  25 400 
 Angus  28 390 
 Highland  56 380 
 Scottish Borders  27 380 
 Edinburgh  124 370 
 Perth and Kinross  34 360 
 Eilean Siar 6 350 
 Stirling  21 350 
 East Renfrewshire 19 340 
 Moray  20 340 
 Orkney Islands  5 340 
 East Dunbartonshire  21 320 
 Aberdeen 46 300 
 Aberdeenshire  47 290 
 Shetland Islands  4 270 
  
   Scotland  1,520 440 
  
  Source: Sheffield Hallam estimates based on official data 
42. The biggest impact, in absolute terms and on a per capita basis, falls on Glasgow 
where the welfare reforms are now estimated to result in a loss of £239m a year, 
equivalent to £580 a year for every adult of working age in the city.  On per capita 
basis a number of other older industrial areas are also hit hard.  These include 
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Inverclyde, Dundee, West Dunbartonshire, North Lanarkshire, Clackmannanshire 
and North and East Ayrshire. 
43. By contrast, the financial loss in Edinburgh – an estimated £124m a year, or £370 
per adult of working age – is significantly smaller.  The places least affected by the 
reforms are in North East Scotland, Orkney and Shetland, and two relatively 
affluent districts (East Renfrewshire and East Dunbartonshire) in the central belt.  
However, it is worth noting that even in some of these local authorities the 
absolute losses remain large.  Aberdeen, for example, can still expect to lose 
£46m a year. 
44. As the earlier reports explained, there are no surprises in this geography.  It is to 
be expected that welfare reforms hit hardest in the places where welfare claimants 
are concentrated, which tend to be in the poorest areas with the highest rates of 
worklessness.  There is a strong correlation between the financial loss per adult of 
working age arising from welfare reform and the Scottish Indices of Deprivation.  
The correlation applies at the level of local authority districts and at the level of 
electoral wards. 
Potential impact on the labour market 
45. Welfare reform can be expected to influence labour market behaviour by changing 
financial incentives.  For an unemployed person, a reduction in the value of 
welfare benefits increases the financial incentive to work.  For a person in work 
who receives benefits or tax credits – and there are a great many in-work 
recipients – a reduction increases the incentive to take on extra hours, or to find 
higher paid work, in order to maintain their income after tax and benefits. 
46. Not all the pre-2015 welfare reforms work in this way or to the same extent.  To 
illustrate this point, Table 3 summarises the likely impacts on work incentives.  
The majority of the reforms can be expected to have increased the financial 
incentive for the non-employed to find work.  The notable exception is the 
reduction in Working Tax Credits, which for some people considering work of less 
than 24 hours a week may actually make taking a job financially less attractive.  
Similarly, the majority of the reforms increased the incentive for an existing 
employee to take on extra hours or seek higher paid work.  The reforms to 
incapacity benefits and the household benefit cap only apply to out-of-work 
claimants. 
47. The scale of the financial incentive varies a great deal.  The loss of entitlement to 
non-means tested incapacity benefit (ESA) can be worth £5,000 a year whereas 
the three-year freeze in the value of Child Benefit has a far smaller impact, in 
some cases below £100 a year.  The withdrawal of Child Benefit from higher 
earners can be large (over £1,000 a year) but seems unlikely to impact a great 
deal on the incentives of the high earner, presumably in just about all cases in full-
time employment already.  For all the welfare changes, of course, there will be 
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variation in the impact and the incentives between different individuals and 
households, depending on detailed circumstances. 
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48. Beyond the changes in eligibility and payment rates, two other policies have 
reinforced the financial incentive to take up employment.  One is the increase in 
Income Tax personal allowances.  Under the Coalition government these were 
increased by more than the rate of inflation, raising the threshold at which Income 
Tax becomes payable.  This has increased the financial incentive to take low-paid 
work, including part-time employment. 
49. The other policy reinforcing the financial incentives has been increased 
conditionality and the wider application of benefit sanctions.  These have been 
Welfare Reform Committee 
The Impact of Welfare Reform on the Scottish Labour Market. An Exploratory Analysis. 
4th Report, 2015 (Session 4) 
11 
 
applied mainly to those on Jobseeker’s Allowance but also increasingly to 
claimants in the Work-Related Activity Group on ESA.  Roughly 6 per cent of the 
stock of JSA claimants is now sanctioned each month, double the rate under the 
pre-2010 Labour government12.  Life on Jobseeker’s Allowance, which was never 
easy, has as a result become distinctly more uncomfortable since 2010, with the 
ever-present threat of sanctions even for those who do their best to comply with all 
the requirements placed upon them by Jobcentre Plus. 
Assessing the labour market impact 
50. The principal complication in disentangling the impact of welfare reform is that it is 
only one of several things happening simultaneously.  In the UK, economic growth 
accelerated from mid-2012 onwards after a period of stagnation in the wake of the 
2008/9 recession, at much the same time as several of the welfare reforms took 
effect.  Compared with 2012, employment is now higher and unemployment lower.  
However, it would be wrong to assume that these improvements can be attributed 
in whole or in part to welfare reform. Benefit changes may (or may not) have 
played a role but other factors such as a revival of consumer spending and 
borrowing, particularly around the housing market, have also contributed to the 
upturn. 
51. The approach deployed here to disentangle the impact of welfare reform is based 
on the big variations from place to place in the scale of the financial losses.  The 
UK benefits system operates under the same rules more or less everywhere but 
because the number and profile of claimants varies a great deal from place to 
place, the welfare reforms impact much more on some places than others. 
52. Table 2, earlier, showed that within Scotland there are big differences between 
local authorities in the financial loss per adult of working age.  At the extremes, the 
average financial loss in Glasgow (£580) is more than double the loss in Shetland 
(£270).  These big differences are important because if the welfare reforms are 
having an important impact on labour market outcomes it should be possible to 
observe a much greater impact in the places where the reforms hit hardest. 
53. The approach adopted here, therefore, is to look closely at the labour market 
changes that have been occurring in different parts of Scotland and see if they 
match the financial impacts of welfare reform. 
54. A practical complication is that not all the pre-2015 welfare reforms have yet come 
to full fruition.  The figures earlier, in Tables 1 and 2, showed the financial losses 
to claimants when the reforms have come into full effect.  Some of the reforms, 
however, particularly those affecting incapacity and disability benefits, are being 
implemented in stages over a number of years.  So far, for example, PIP has 
replaced DLA only for new claimants and the re-testing of existing DLA claimants 
is not scheduled to begin until October 2015 and not expected to be completed 
until 2018.  The incapacity benefit reforms have also fallen well behind schedule 
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because of the backlog in undertaking Work Capability Assessments (in part 
because of the loss of the original prime contractor) and in processing appeals, 
which in turn is delaying the implementation of means-testing for those placed in 
the Work-Related Activity Group. 
55. As noted in the February 2015 report to the Scottish Parliament13, taking the pre-
2015 welfare reform package as a whole, in the spring of 2015 around 30 per cent 
of the overall financial loss to claimants in Scotland still lay ahead. 
56. Bearing in mind that most labour market statistics do not themselves come any 
further forward than the end of 2014, the financial losses arising from welfare 
reform, shown in Tables 1 and 2 earlier, have therefore been adjusted to exclude 
the estimated share of the losses that at the end of 2014 still lay in the future: 
 90 per cent of the loss arising from the changeover from DLA to PIP 
 30 per cent of the loss arising from incapacity benefit reform 
57. The financial loss arising from the withdrawal of Child Benefit from higher earners 
is also excluded on the basis that this has little potential relevance to work 
incentives. 
58. The effect of these omissions is to reduce the financial losses included in the 
labour market impact assessment, presented below, by around one-third.  This 
proportion varies little between Scottish local authorities so, for example, Glasgow 
still remains the worst-hit by welfare reform. 
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Recent labour market trends 
Out-of-work benefits 
59. It is appropriate to begin by looking at the relationship between welfare reform and 
out-of-work benefit claimant rates. 
Figure 1: Out-of-work benefit claimant rate, Feb 2011- Nov 2014 
Sources: DWP and Sheffield Hallam estimates 
60. Figure 1 shows the relationship between the percentage point change in the out-
of-work benefit claimant (on the vertical axis) and the average financial loss per 
adult of working age arising from welfare reform (on the horizontal axis) by local 
authority in Scotland between February 2011 and November 2014.  This period 
begins just before the first of the Coalition government’s reforms came into effect 
and finishes with the latest available benefit data.  The dots on the scatter diagram 
are Scotland’s 32 local authorities.  ‘Out-of-work benefits’ is a standard DWP 
category principally comprising all those on JSA, on IB/ESA and on Income 
Support as a lone parent. 
61. It is immediately obvious from this first chart that there is a relationship between 
the impact of welfare reform and the fall in the out-of-work claimant rate: the 
bigger the financial loss arising from welfare reform, the bigger the fall in the 
claimant rate14.  Very broadly, in the Scottish local authorities where welfare 
reform has hit hardest the fall in the claimant rate has been 3-4 percentage points, 
compared to around 2 percentage points where welfare reform has impacted less. 
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Sources: DWP and Sheffield Hallam estimates 
63. Figure 2 disaggregates the change in the out-of-work claimant rate into its two 
largest components – the change in the Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA) claimant 
rate and the change in the Incapacity Benefit/Employment and Support Allowance 
(ESA) claimant rate.  This highlights an important difference: the relationship 
between the change in the benefit claimant rate and the impact of welfare reform 
applies to JSA but not to ESA.  Indeed ESA claimant rates have barely fallen at all 
in Scotland (or indeed elsewhere in the UK) – generally by less than half a 
percentage point.  The reductions in the ESA claimant rate have been no larger in 
the local authorities where welfare reforms have hit hardest. 
64. That the fall has just about all been in JSA rather than ESA numbers is in some 
respects surprising.  The welfare reforms have not in themselves removed 
entitlement to potential JSA claimants (though the tougher stance by Jobcentre 
Plus on sanctions may have had this effect) whereas the new medical test for ESA 
(the Work Capability Assessment) has made access to incapacity benefits more 
difficult for new claimants and disqualified some existing claimants.  Furthermore, 
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the financial losses to incapacity claimants are substantial – an estimated £280m 
a year in Scotland when this element of the reform package has come to full 
fruition15. 
Wider labour market variables 
65. The benefit numbers, deployed above, have the advantage that they are accurate 
and robust.  Other official labour market data is based in whole or in part on 
sample surveys and can therefore be distinctly erratic, especially at the local 
scale.  This applies in particular to local data from the government’s Labour Force 
Survey, which is the up-to-date source of information on labour force participation 
and employment rates. 
66. To help circumvent these statistical difficulties, we have grouped Scotland’s 32 
local authorities into nine groups.  For each of the groups, the Labour Force 
Survey data is likely to be more reliable than for individual authorities though the 
effects of sampling error cannot be completely eliminated: 
 Ayrshire: East Ayrshire, North Ayrshire, South Ayrshire 
 Fife and Central: Clackmannanshire, Falkirk, Fife, Stirling 
 Greater Aberdeen: Aberdeen, Aberdeenshire 
 Greater Dundee: Dundee, Angus, Perth & Kinross 
 Greater Edinburgh: Edinburgh, East Lothian, Midlothian, West Lothian 
 Greater Glasgow: Glasgow, East Dunbartonshire, East Renfrewshire, 
Inverclyde, Renfrewshire, West Dunbartonshire 
 Highlands & Islands: Argyll & Bute, Eilean Siar, Highland, Moray, Orkney, 
Shetland 
 Lanarkshire: North Lanarkshire, South Lanarkshire 
 Southern Scotland: Borders, Dumfries & Galloway 
67. This grouping has the added advantage that some of the areas are nearer to 
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Figure 3: Wider labour market variables, 2011-2014  


















Sources: LFS and Sheffield Hallam estimates 
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68. and Glasgow, labour market trends in one area will interact with trends in 
neighbouring areas. 
69. Figure 3 looks at the relationships between the financial losses arising from 
welfare reform and three variables from the Labour Force Survey, using the nine 
groups of local authority areas.  The diagrams look at the changes over the 2011-
14 period16. 
70. The first part of Figure 3 examines the economic activity rate – the share of adults 
of working age who are in work or seeking work.  In theory, this should be one of 
the variables that responds most to welfare reform because a prime aim of the 
reforms is to raise labour market engagement.  Even if welfare reform does not 
succeed in increasing employment, it should raise the number of people looking 
for work.  The regression line in this diagram goes in the ‘right’ direction – the 
increase in the activity rate is higher where the financial losses from welfare 
reform are greater – but the strength of the relationship (measured by the R2) is 
poor so little or no weight can be placed on the trend line. 
71. The second part of Figure 3 looks at the employment rate – the share of adults of 
working age in employment.  This too shows a relationship that points in the ‘right’ 
direction – the increase is higher where the financial losses from welfare reform 
are greater – but once more the statistical association is weak and can be given 
little or no weight. 
72. The third part of Figure 3 looks at the unemployment rate.  This is measured 
differently here to the JSA claimant count.  The Labour Force Survey uses the 
International Labour Organisation (ILO) definition of unemployment which counts 
anyone who is out-of-work, has looked for work within the last four weeks and is 
available to start work within two weeks, whether or not they are claiming 
unemployment benefits.  In the UK over recent years the ILO definition has 
generated unemployment figures around a million higher than the JSA claimant 
count.  The regression line again goes in the right direction – the higher the 
financial losses arising from welfare reform, the greater the fall in the 
unemployment rate – and this is consistent with the trends in benefit data (see 
Figure 2 earlier) but once more the statistical association is weak. 
73. The Labour Force Survey data does not therefore provide convincing evidence of 
links between welfare reform and labour market outcomes, though some of the 
problem may lie with shortcomings and sampling errors in the data itself. 
Employment 
74. The best official statistics on employment in each local authority, from the 
Business Register and Employment Survey (BRES) are something of a halfway 
house, in terms of reliability, between the benefit claimant numbers and the 
Labour Force Survey: they are tolerably reliable but still affected by errors and 
discontinuities which can distort the measurement of change through time. 
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Figure 4: Employment, late 2010 – late 2013 
(1) Local authorities 
 
(2) Groups of local authorities 
Sources: BRES and Sheffield Hallam estimates 
75. Figure 4 therefore presents two views of the relationship between changes in 
employment and the financial losses arising from welfare reform, one for all 32 
Scottish local authorities and the other for the nine groups of authorities.  The 
employment data is the number of employee jobs located in each area.  The time 
period covered in 2010 to 2013, which given the timing of the annual BRES survey 
in practice means late 2010 to late 2013.  BRES data for 2014 will not be available 
until later in 2015.  The period of fastest post-recession growth in the UK (during 
2014) is unfortunately therefore missing from these statistics. 
76. Figure 4 provides no evidence that there is a relationship between employment 
growth, by authority or by wider area group, and the financial loss arising from 
welfare reform.  In both cases, the scatter of observations is considerable. 
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Comparisons with other upturns 
77. Recent labour market trends across Scotland therefore provide only limited 
evidence that welfare reform is an important causal factor.  The important 
exception concerns the trend in JSA claimant numbers, which in turn underpins 
the trend in overall out-of-work claimant numbers.  The reduction in JSA numbers 
is higher in the places where the financial loss from welfare reform is larger.  This 
could be interpreted as evidence that, for JSA claimants at least, welfare reform is 
working. 
78. The problem with this interpretation is that when unemployment falls during an 
economic upturn it generally does so more in some places than others, 
irrespective of welfare reform.  In particular, it is always likely that in an upturn the 
reduction in unemployment will be greater in the places with initially high 
unemployment than in more prosperous, low unemployment areas.  This is partly 
because the high unemployment areas are by definition where most of the 
unemployed live, and partly because of arithmetic.  A reduction of, say, four 
percentage points in the unemployment rate is possible where the unemployment 
rate starts at eight per cent, but not where the rate starts at just three or four per 
cent.  Bear in mind here that unemployment rates never fall to zero – there is 
always some frictional unemployment, as people change jobs, even in the most 
prosperous areas. 
79. The point here is that economic upturns are normally associated with convergence 
in unemployment rates, and the high unemployment areas are the ones most 
affected by welfare reform.  The more rapid fall in JSA numbers that can be 
observed in the areas hit hardest by welfare reform may in practice have little to 
do with welfare reform. 
80. Two upturns are never exactly the same so finding the perfect match for the 
recent post-recession period is impossible.  Figure 5 therefore compares the 
reduction in the JSA claimant rate between February 2011 and November 2014 
(taken from Figure 2 earlier) with two other periods when there was a similar 
percentage point fall in claimant count unemployment17 in Scotland: 
 February 1998 to November 2004.  This is a longer period than Feb 2011 to 
Nov 2014 but one in which claimant unemployment fell from broadly similar 
levels and by similar amounts, though unemployment was already well down on 
peak levels in the early 1990s18. 
 August 1993 to August 1996.  This is a more comparable period in the 
economic cycle, covering the immediate recovery from recession, but one in 
which claimant unemployment was falling from a far higher starting point.  
Unemployment Benefit had also not yet been replaced by Jobseeker’s 
Allowance, with its significantly more restrictive entitlement for claimants of 
more than six months. 
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81. Figure 5: Comparison between upturns 
Feb 2011 – Nov 2014 
Feb 1998 – Nov 2004 
Aug 1993 – Aug 1996 
Sources: DWP and Sheffield Hallam estimates 
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82. To maintain comparability, the horizontal axis on all three diagrams – the financial 
loss arising from the pre-2015 welfare reforms – is held constant.  Left to right, 
each Scottish local authority is therefore at the same place on the scale in each 
diagram.  The point here is not to suggest that these particular welfare reforms 
had any impact on earlier events.  Rather, the point is simply to examine whether 
the pattern of change by local authority that can be observed in the 2011-14 
period is similar to that in previous upturns. 
83. As will be immediately apparent, there is very strong similarity between the 
geography of the reduction in unemployment in all three periods.  The places that 
have experienced the biggest percentage point reduction in JSA unemployment 
during the recent upturn, which were also the places hit hardest by welfare reform, 
are the same places that experienced the biggest reduction in claimant 
unemployment during previous upturns. 
84. In the present context this is key observation.  What it suggests is that the big 
reductions in JSA unemployment in a number of Scottish local authorities cannot 
be attributed to welfare reform.  Rather, these big reductions in areas of high 
unemployment are a normal feature of economic upturns. 
Employment, output and productivity 
85. The recovery from the 2008/9 recession does however differ from other economic 
upturns in one important respect: it has been far more labour-intensive. 
86. This point is illustrated by Figure 6.  The first part shows the trend in UK economic 
output (GDP) from the start of the recent recession and compares this with the 
trends during and after the recessions at the start of the 1980s and 1990s.  During 
the recent, 2008/9 recession output fell further and has subsequently recovered 
more slowly than in the previous two recessions.  The second part of Figure 6 
shows the trends in UK employment over the same periods.  This shows that 
employment did not fall as steeply during the recent recession and has then risen 
relatively strongly.  The third part compares the employment trends in Scotland 
and the UK since 2008 and shows that they have been broadly similar. 
87. These trends are well known and have been the subject of much discussion.  In 
effect, the recent resurgence in employment, in the context of modest increases in 
output, indicates that labour productivity in the UK has risen little if at all since the 
2008/9 recession. 
88. The relevance of these aggregate trends is that they are at the very least 
consistent with welfare reform.  If welfare reform has made staying out-of-work on 
benefit less attractive, and if as a result more men and women have been willing 
to take low-wage employment, or indeed any work at all, the effect may have been 
to encourage employers to take on additional labour rather than invest in 
machinery and new working methods that deliver higher productivity.  Aggregate 
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economic trends may therefore after all point towards labour market impacts 
arising from welfare reform.  And welfare reform may, after all, explain why the 
recent upturn has been different from its predecessors. 
Figure 6: Comparison of recessions and recoveries 
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UK and Scottish employment since start of 2008 recession 
Sources: ONS, LFS 
89. It is equally possible, however, that the aggregate economic trends have nothing 
to do with welfare reform.  The slow growth in labour productivity in the recent 
upturn may instead reflect the particular structure of the upturn, driven by yet more 
consumer spending on low-productivity services (retailing, leisure etc.) rather than 
by a revival in manufacturing or exports, and by expansion in part-time working 
and zero-hours contracts.  The ready availability of migrant workers may also 
have helped fuel a labour-intensive upturn. 
90. The timing of the divergence in employment trends between the recent and 
previous recessions is difficult to reconcile with explanations based on welfare 
reform.  The first of the Coalition government’s reforms only began to take effect in 
the spring of 2011, some three years after the start of the 2008 recession, and 
measures such as the ‘bedroom tax’ and household benefit cap came into effect 
two full years later in the spring of 2013.  By this time employment levels had 
already diverged from what might have been expected on the basis of trends in 
earlier recessions.  In the period up to spring 2011, only the new Work Capability 
Assessment for new incapacity claimants – a Labour initiative – was fully 
underway.  Although this is a significant part of the overall welfare reform 
package, its impact on claimant numbers is far too small to explain the resilience 
in overall employment levels during and immediately after the recession. 
91. Furthermore, interpreting aggregate labour market trends in the upturn as being 
the result of welfare reform remains inconsistent with the finer-grain data for local 
areas.  If welfare reform really was the driving force in generating higher 
employment and lower unemployment, it would have been reasonable to expect 
greater impacts in the places in Scotland where welfare reform has hit hardest.  
As the evidence presented earlier showed, this is not the case. 
92. That across the UK economy as a whole employment has risen faster than might 
have been expected, given the growth in output, can therefore be no more than a 
footnote.  It does not provide convincing evidence of impacts from welfare reform. 
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93. On balance, the evidence in this report provides little support for the view that 
welfare reform is having important and positive impacts on the labour market in 
Scotland. 
94. The out-of-work benefit claimant rate, and more particularly the JSA claimant rate, 
has fallen faster in the parts of Scotland where the welfare reforms have resulted 
in the largest financial losses.  Superficially, this might be interpreted as evidence 
that welfare reform is working in the way the Westminster government intended.  
Closer examination, however, shows that similar falls in unemployment in these 
places have been a feature of previous upturns.  Recent trends cannot therefore 
be attributed simply to welfare reform. 
95. Looking ahead, the Conservative government in Westminster has announced a 
further £12bn a year of welfare cuts to be implemented over the next few years.  
These include reductions in tax credits, a lower household benefit cap, lower ESA 
payment rates and a four-year freeze in the value of most working-age benefits, 
including Housing Benefit in the private-rented sector.  In the light of the evidence 
on the impact of the pre-2015 welfare reforms it is hard to see this new round of 
reductions having any greater labour market impact.  Indeed, given that reductions 
to tax credits account for around half the additional planned saving, and that a 
large proportion of these cuts falls on in-work claimants, a reduction in the 
numbers on out-of-work benefits seems even less likely as a result of the new 
round of welfare reforms. 
96. The analysis presented here remains exploratory.  A final word on the labour 
market impact of welfare reform would require a substantially larger and more 
wide-ranging exercise, beyond the scope of the present project.  Nevertheless, 
there is sufficient evidence in the present report to cast doubt on one of the central 
claims used to justify welfare reform.  Welfare reform does reduce public 
expenditure and thereby the budget deficit but it does not, it would seem, lead to 
higher employment or lower unemployment. 
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